Is your SaaS actually protected from AI disruption, or are acquirers walking away without even looking?
In this episode, Rob Walling talks with Einar Vollset of Discretion Capital for a front-lines SaaS M&A market report, covering how the acquisition climate has shifted since 2021, why some PE firms now require at least one AI moat before they’ll even look at a deal, and a breakdown of all five moats: hardware-software coupling, two-sided network effects, communication graph embeds, proprietary data with closed feedback loops, and operational switching costs.
Topics we cover:
- (2:05) – State of SaaS M&A from 2020 to today
- (5:49) – Why 2021 was the best time to sell
- (7:38) – How the 2022 downturn raised the acquisition bar
- (8:59) – The SaaS apocalypse narrative and AI FUD
- (12:26) – Why bootstrappers should care about exit markets
- (15:52) – AI moat #1: Hardware-software coupling
- (17:38) – AI moat #2: Marketplace scale and two-sided network effects
- (20:05) – AI moat #3: Communication graph and relationship embed
- (21:27) – AI moat #4: Proprietary data with closed feedback loops
- (23:20) – AI moat #5: Operational embed and switching costs
- (27:28) – Some PE firms now require at least one moat
- (29:23) – AI-native SaaS faces even higher hurdles
Links from the show:
- MicroConf Connect Next Live Session: Jim Zarkadas on User-Friendly Onboarding (June 17)
- TinySeed
- MicroConf YouTube
- The SaaS Playbook
- Discretion Capital M&A Guide
- Fiscal.ai
- DealForma
- BuiltWith
- ZyraTalk
- EverCommerce
- Einar Vollset (@einarvollset) | X
If you have questions about starting or scaling a software business that you’d like for us to cover, please submit your question for an upcoming episode. We’d love to hear from you!
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Rob Walling (01:00): And we have monthly Connect Live sessions and AMAs with yours truly. My AMAs are once a quarter and our next Connect Live session is Jim Zardakis talking about how to build a user-friendly onboarding workflow. If you join before June 17th, you can attend that live. microconfconnect.com if you’re interested. And if you haven’t already, you should subscribe to the MicroConf YouTube channel. We’ve been releasing the talks from MicroConf Portland, including Jason Cohen’s keynote about breaking through growth ceilings. That was one of the top-rated talks at the event. That’s YouTube.com/@microconf. And remember, that channel is separate from the Rob Walling channel, which we renamed a few months ago. So YouTube.com@/microconf. And with that, let’s dive into my conversation with Einar Vollset. Einar Vollset, welcome back to the program.
Einar Vollset (02:04): Thanks for having me.
Rob Walling (02:05): We are here to talk about moats and really about the state of SaaS exits between two and 20 million ARR and the shifts that you’re seeing. And let’s date this. This is May 15th, we’re recording, 2026. And if we had recorded in 2021, you’d have been like, “Oh my God, money’s coming. Everybody’s buying everything. Mark it up.” And then if we recorded in mid-2022, sentiment shifted way, way down.
Einar Vollset (02:35): Terrible. Yeah. Russian invasion of Ukraine, et cetera. It was rough.
Rob Walling (02:39): Yep. And so in your role as the founder and principal at Discretion Capital, which is sell-side M&A advisory for SaaS founders doing between two and 20 million, you see a lot of deals, you have your pulse on the sentiment of acquisitions. You’ve in fact written a book on the topic. Remind me of the title.
Einar Vollset (02:59): The title is, hang on. Let me just grab the book so that I can actually remember exactly what it’s called.
Rob Walling (03:03): Can’t remember his own book title. It’s so long. Get ready.
Einar Vollset (03:05): That’s how it goes. I’m not a professional author like you.
Rob Walling (03:08): Buckle up, listeners. Here it goes.
Einar Vollset (03:10): Are you ready? The Definitive Guide to M&A for B2B SaaS Between Two and 20 Million of ARR.
Rob Walling (03:16): Wow. Is that a—
Einar Vollset (03:17): And there’s actually a physical copy. If you’d like a physical copy, you can email me and I’ll send you a physical copy.
Rob Walling (03:21): That’s the title for three different books, right? Because it’s very long. That’s the first chapter is what you’ve just said.
Einar Vollset (03:27): If I stretch it out, you know, with my fancy three books, I don’t know. I just put everything in one.
Rob Walling (03:34): And folks can get physical copies. You also have discretioncapital.com/guide if they want to read the whole thing. That’s your bona fides. That’s why folks should listen to you in this episode. And I wanted to kick off by having you share what you were telling me offline right before we started about how this acquisition market has felt since, let’s say, 2021. So talk us through it.
Einar Vollset (03:57): Yeah. I think people understand pretty well that in the public markets there’s sort of a risk on, risk off sentiment. And that is also true in the B2B SaaS acquisition world. Particularly when I’m talking about this, it applies at pretty much every revenue range, but it definitely applies sub-20 million, because in that universe of potential exits there’s a lot of private equity. And so the public market sentiment is quite well expressed in terms of the way private equity works and how they’re feeling about the market. We’ve gone through a number of cycles since I’ve been doing this, because unbelievably I’ve been doing this now for nearly 10 years. I think back to even before 2021, like 2020, during COVID. Just that spring of 2020 seems kind of like ancient history now, although it doesn’t feel that long ago.
Einar Vollset (05:01): It was complete risk off. The public markets were crashing. There were stories about population declining 30% globally, horrible time, not good. I remember in particular we had one deal going in diligence for Discretion. It was selling to a US Fortune 500 company. All of a sudden they went quiet and it was right around quarter end and we were like, “What happened?” And then we saw their quarterly report and they stated that they were suspending their M&A program, which is not great if you’re about a month away from closing. So terrible risk-off sentiment. Then, turns out, nevermind, it’s 2021 and money is everywhere.
Einar Vollset (05:49): This is the time you should have sold: 2021. Really, if you had a one million ARR-plus SaaS business doing more than, say, 100% NRR, and I’m going to define what NRR is, then you could sell for a good multiple in 2021. Things were great. Thresholds were low. SaaS was the future, everything was great. The thresholds that private equity were using to filter were quite low. So like I said, 100% NRR. NRR is net revenue retention, or net dollar retention sometimes. It basically means: start of the year, what ARR do you have? Then look at that cohort at the end of the year. How much of that revenue do you still have, and you get to count upsells and expansion?
Einar Vollset (06:44): So that’s why—
Rob Walling (06:45): Yeah, expansion revenue contributes to NRR. I talk about net negative churn and expansion revenue on the podcast, but NRR is kind of the flip side of that.
Einar Vollset (06:56): And actually there are two things to know. Private equity tends to worry a lot about retention. There are two defining metrics of how recurring your recurring revenue actually is. One is gross revenue retention, which is literally: January 1st, what ARR do you have? And then December 31st, what percentage of that revenue, not counting any upsells, do you still have? The maximum is 100%. NRR is that, but you get credit for upsells and expansion revenue.
Rob Walling (07:29): And so in 2021, you used to come on the podcast and say, “Hey, if you’re north of a million you could sell.” And these days it’s two million.
Einar Vollset (07:38): Yeah. There’s a reason my book and Discretion Capital focus on two to 20. It’s because right now it’s probably more like two million than one million. And then 2022 rolled around and it was a very different climate completely. Russia invaded Ukraine and all of a sudden private equity was not buying anything. They were unsure again about the market. And so all of a sudden it was like, okay, now not only do you need to be probably two million of ARR before we’ll start looking, and your NRR needs to be over 100%, but we also started to hear more about gross revenue retention being important. That’s usually how we can tell that sentiment has shifted: we hear more and more things being thrown up as filters. “We won’t look unless X.” That’s usually the signal.
Einar Vollset (08:33): But then it recovered again, which sentiment tends to do quite quickly, and things have been good through 2023, 2024, 2025. The market came back in a pretty major way. Some of that has to do with the fact that these private equity companies have an awful lot of dry powder to deploy. But in general it was good times. And then probably last summer is when people started this whole narrative about the SaaS apocalypse: is AI going to kill all of SaaS? That sentiment intensified in the fall and particularly in the new year. It partly had to do with Claude Code, I feel like. People really started down this agentic coding, agentic doing-everything path.
Einar Vollset (09:25): And I think a lot of the more influencer-type people, probably pretty far disconnected from SaaS in general, started talking about how all SaaS is dead and everyone’s just going to vibe code everything. You could see that in the public market ETFs that track public SaaS companies: way down. And that’s still true. It’s way, way down to the point where someone told me that despite growing significantly faster and being significantly more profitable, the price-to-revenue multiples of SaaS companies is actually less than industrials now, which is a little peculiar. But yeah, because of this, buyers have lately started asking: okay, there’s GRR and NRR, but how do we know this business isn’t going to zero because of AI?
Einar Vollset (10:22): We really started seeing those conversations earlier this year.
Rob Walling (10:27): Once the FUD, the fear, uncertainty, and doubt, and as you said, influencers who’ve never run a SaaS company are saying SaaS is dying. And it’s like, geez.
Einar Vollset (10:34): I always thought it was weird. Look, and this is just my personal view. I think AI is amazing. I think AI is super impactful. But one of the funny things for me is: this is still software. I think people lose track of that sometimes because they talk to it, so they anthropomorphize it and think of it as somehow different to software. But look, it’s software. And if you’re very bearish on SaaS companies, then you’re sort of saying that the companies that are the best in the world at deploying software are going to be bad at deploying this particular kind of software.
Rob Walling (11:12): That’s the thing. Whether SaaS goes by another name or not, it’s not like ChatGPT and Claude are going to do everything and no one’s ever going to pay for software ever again. As bootstrappers, we’re actually in a really good position as the market shifts. We don’t have these incumbent positions so to speak.
Einar Vollset (11:31): It’s great. I actually think it’s a great time to be an early-stage software entrepreneur, just because there is so much uncertainty and the cost of developing software has gone way down. That’s definitely true. And honestly, I think we see that inside the TinySeed portfolio. We’ve invested in 200-plus companies and I’ve never seen the sentiment be so different between what we’re seeing internally in the Slack channels among founders, who are like, “Things are going super well, growth is accelerating, we’re adding features in three weeks that normally took us six months,” and what the public markets are saying.
Rob Walling (12:11): And growing.
Einar Vollset (12:12): Yeah. And same with most of the public SaaS companies reporting. They’re saying, “We’re not seeing any disruption whatsoever from AI, no additional churn.” But in the public markets, the sky is falling. It’s strange to me.
Rob Walling (12:26): Sentiment versus reality is a thing.
Rob Walling (12:28): And I want to cut in here. I want to get into the moats, these AI moats that you talked about. But before we do that, I just want to mention: if you’re a bootstrapper or mostly bootstrapped and you’re thinking, “Well, I’m never going to sell. Why should I care about any of this?” There are a couple things. Number one, everyone sells eventually, or you shut the business down. That’s basically it. And I’ve seen 100% of the people who told me they would never sell hit a point where they either get tired of it or realize they can sell for 10, 15, 20 million dollars, and something comes up and they’re just like, “I don’t want to do this anymore.” They have a family shift, they get a divorce, or they get married and have kids. It’s like saying you’re never going to do something. You can’t say never, right?
Rob Walling (13:12): But the other thing is: if you’re a bootstrapper, you have an asset that’s worth a lot of money. Just knowing that, whether you plan to sell or not, paying attention to these markets means you can say, “Oh, today if I’m doing two million and I’m doubling this year, six months ago maybe I could have sold for 10 to 15 million dollars.” Today maybe that’s not the case. It’s just good to know. It’s like knowing the value of your house. You don’t need to know it all the time, but you should pay a little attention because there might be an opportunity or there might be a storm coming.
Rob Walling (13:42): So what we’re going to dive into today are things that you called AI moats. You posted these in the TinySeed Slack for our founders and you said, “I’ve increasingly been seeing that buyers of B2B SaaS are requiring or favoring businesses with these AI moats.” I want to talk through all five. Before we do that, I talked in The SaaS Playbook about four types of SaaS moats, and I think there’s some overlap. I had integrations, especially custom integrations that are hard to get and that make you a core part of a company’s workflow. If your software is deeply integrated into their HubSpot CRM and HubSpot won’t do that integration anymore, that’s an interesting moat. Having a strong brand, where people buy Salesforce, people buy Zapier. High switching costs in general, which I think is one of yours. And then owned traffic channels. SignWell has really good SEO, for example. That’s a weaker moat, I’ll say, because you can lose an owned traffic channel.
Einar Vollset (15:00): It’s interesting. I still think brand is a strong moat. I actually think owned traffic channels are also kind of a strong moat still. Is there disruption because of AEO vs. SEO? Yeah, but it’s correlated. Integrations, I actually think with an asterisk. I think integrations in and of themselves are no longer a moat just because it’s so much easier to build them. But to your point, if they’re harder to get because everyone is protecting themselves from AI, then it could definitely be a moat.
Rob Walling (15:39): And then I had a false moat, even at that point, which was unique features. As developers, we think, “Oh, I came up with this new innovation and I built this thing that no one else has.” And I was like, “Nope, false moat.”
Einar Vollset (15:51): That’s not a thing anymore.
Rob Walling (15:52): That still especially doesn’t hold today. So getting back to your AI moats: in your Slack message, you said these moats vary a fair bit between buyers as in which ones they hold most important, but it might behoove all of you to think about how your product relates to these, and it might be a factor as you think about growing further and prioritizing product direction. And so the first one of five is hardware-software coupling. The product delivers superior performance, reliability, or economics through tight integration with a hardware layer. Replacement is not an API swap. It has physical downstream effects. Tell us more about that.
Einar Vollset (16:31): This is the one I know the least about, to be perfectly honest, but that makes sense, right? If you have a hardware component that is tightly integrated into your product and it’s a key part of what you deliver, and it’s not just like an off-the-shelf hardware component with an open API that anyone can just vibe code into in an afternoon, then yes, I can definitely see that being a moat.
Rob Walling (17:03): We have TinySeed companies that have hardware scales and digital scales at grocery stores.
Einar Vollset (17:10): And EV charging.
Rob Walling (17:11): Yep. Software that runs in the charger. We have a physical printer located at certain warehouse locations. Those are all moats, right? That’s what we’re talking about here.
Einar Vollset (17:25): Those are all moats. And it’s funny because when we invested in those, it was kind of a minus. It was like—
Rob Walling (17:32): Because it’s hardware.
Einar Vollset (17:33): Yeah, it’s a hardware component. It’s going to be hard to scale. And now we’re like, yeah, actually—
Rob Walling (17:37): That’s fine.
Rob Walling (17:38): Number two is marketplace scale and two-sided network effects. The platform becomes more valuable as participants join each side of the market. More supply attracts more demand and more demand attracts more supply. Does this completely overturn my “don’t bootstrap a two-sided marketplace” advice? Talk us through it.
Einar Vollset (18:01): I sure think it’s hard as hell to do. It’s hard to do, but hard to undo if you succeed at it. I think that’s true.
Rob Walling (18:11): If you tried to bootstrap eBay or Uber or any two-sided marketplace we can think of today, you’re going to fail. But if you could do it, there’s a reason eBay has been around. They treat their sellers awfully. They’re hard to work with. But sellers don’t change because that’s where all the buyers are. It’s so sticky.
Einar Vollset (18:32): No, I agree. And it’s not that unusual for folks to have a component of marketplace stuff alongside their core product. Before I was always like, “Yeah, this is great.” But now I’m like, “Actually this might be the moat, because the marketplace as it scales makes the software stickier.”
Rob Walling (18:55): But we’re in agreement that it’s extremely hard. I say it’s approximately 0% chance you’ll pull this off if you don’t already have one side of the market and you’re bootstrapping. If you’re going to raise a big chunk of money, you can take a run at this. But I’ve known maybe two people who’ve bootstrapped successful two-sided marketplaces, and it’s hard.
Einar Vollset (19:14): I don’t think I know anyone personally.
Rob Walling (19:16): I’ve seen people chime in on Twitter threads saying, “Oh, I did this.” And I asked, “Was it great? Should people do it?” And the answer was, “It was like eating glass.” And I was like, “Okay, so we’re in agreement then.”
Einar Vollset (19:31): Eating glass. But if you succeed at eating glass—
Rob Walling (19:35): Somehow it’s worth a lot of money.
Einar Vollset (19:36): The moat is that anyone else has to ask, “Do I really want to eat all this glass?”
Rob Walling (19:41): Right. And when I say don’t bootstrap a two-sided marketplace, I always mean unless you already have access to one or both sides. Me bootstrapping a marketplace of founders and investors is different. Dan Andrews and Ian starting Dynamite Jobs, where you need people hiring and you need remote job seekers, they had access to one or both sides. Those are the exceptions. But let’s dive into AI moat number three: communication graph and relationship embed. The product becomes the system where people and organizations coordinate work, messages, approvals, shared context, and recurring interactions accumulate inside the platform. Talk us through that one.
Einar Vollset (20:25): That’s one of those things where it’s a little bit similar to whenever we talk about pricing. One of the things you always say is: there’s got to be something else going on when you log in. You’re not going to sell 10 seats to a company if every single one of those 10 logins is the same. It’s related to that. SaaS buyers really want to deal with what we’d call system-of-record type systems, where this is where you run your business. This is where you’re sending messages back and forth, this is where the context is, this is where the coordination between people is happening.
Einar Vollset (21:05): The various states of the conversation, all that kind of thing is on the platform, and that just makes it a lot harder to move off. I think that’s definitely, definitely true.
Rob Walling (21:15): Slack is a perfect example of this.
Einar Vollset (21:17): Yeah. We try to leave Slack, feels like every year, and then we come back and we’re like, “Please give me some more of that sweet, sweet Slack.”
Rob Walling (21:24): Everyone’s still using it. Number four: proprietary data with closed feedback loops. The company captures exclusive, continuously refreshed data, and uses it to improve automation, decision making, and product performance over time. The moat depends on containment. Data flows in but does not leak out via APIs.
Einar Vollset (21:48): Yeah. This is another one where the incentives are now for companies to not give you access to even your own data through an API. That’s the key difference, right? The data has to flow in but not flow out. Because if I can take the entirety of the data that’s in there and quickly export it including all the timestamps so that I can replicate the whole thing, then yeah, the moat is gone.
Rob Walling (22:24): So examples of this. You think Crunchbase has this?
Einar Vollset (22:29): No, I don’t think Crunchbase has it. Not really. That’s more like I’m in there by myself looking at data, and that’s a little more replaceable. I’m trying to think of—
Rob Walling (22:42): BuiltWith.com?
Einar Vollset (22:43): Again—
Rob Walling (22:44): They’re scraping the internet constantly. It’s constantly refreshed. You can’t get all of it out.
Einar Vollset (22:48): You can’t get all of it out. That’s true. Yeah. Those kinds of things are actually reasonably good examples. I’m trying to think of better ones.
Rob Walling (22:55): Fiscal.ai.
Einar Vollset (22:57): Fiscal AI is a good one.
Rob Walling (22:59): TinySeed company.
Einar Vollset (23:00): Yeah, TinySeed company. And DealForma is a good one, where data goes in and doesn’t necessarily just flow out immediately. And even if you took a snapshot, what good is that tomorrow? You still need the data next month, and the month after, and every single month. So yeah, those are good examples.
Rob Walling (23:20): Let’s move on to our fifth and final, which is operational embed and switching costs. Switching costs are the time, risk, and expense of replacing a system. The product is embedded in daily workflows, integrations, reporting, and team routines, which makes replacement disruptive and costly.
Einar Vollset (23:40): Yeah. That’s your classic system of record. You’re the finance team and everybody uses QuickBooks or some ERP to coordinate absolutely everything. Or you’re a warehouse and all your stuff coming in and going out, approvals, shipping, is all in one system. You could build something that does the same, but the risk to your actual business of that collapsing is high enough that it just isn’t worth it. And this ties a little bit with your moat around brand, because I think particularly technical people tend to overestimate how much time folks are willing to spend optimizing their software costs. For a lot of businesses, the cost of software just isn’t that significant and they don’t care.
Einar Vollset (24:33): It’s much more important to people to be able to say, “I trust this brand, this company to do this job well, and I’m willing to pay for that.” And partly what you’re paying for is the brand and the brand trust. And honestly, being able to call someone up or email them and know that getting you back up and running is their number one priority. You’re never getting that with something you vibe coded at home. I think that’s a key, key part of it.
Rob Walling (25:00): Yeah. That’s the thing. If you’re a business paying 10 grand a year for your system of record and someone comes along and says, “We have most of the same features and we’ll be eight grand a year,” you’re like, “No.” “We’ll be five grand a year.” Probably still no. Because it’s the switching costs and the pain and the retraining and what if stuff goes wrong and how do I trust that your software is actually good? Does it actually do what you say? Is it buggy? Are you going to be in business tomorrow? It’s not just about price.
Rob Walling (25:39): It would maybe matter if someone came along and said, “Ours is a thousand dollars a year.” But now I think you’re not going to stick around. It’s this interesting conundrum. If you’re paying a hundred grand a year, obviously there’s more leeway, but cost becomes much, much less relevant because switching cost is risk.
Einar Vollset (26:05): And I think cost is not that important for most businesses. And I also think a lot of technical founders hugely overestimate how much time people want to spend fiddling with their software systems. I sort of want to put all the influencer types who say AI is going to eat everything in a room and ask: how many of you are still running the open-source AI agent setup you were evangelical about two months ago? Because there’s a surprising number of deeply technical people who were super excited about it and then two weeks later I see them on Twitter saying, “I just can’t.”
Einar Vollset (26:59): “It breaks all the time. I spend more time fixing it than getting productivity out of it.” And that’s just you, a technical person. Now apply that to a business doing millions in revenue with employees to pay. Why would I want a vibe-coded thing to save an inconsequential amount? The downside risk is just way, way too high.
Rob Walling (27:28): And in the ensuing thread under these five AI moats, TinySeed founders were asking questions. And one of the things you said was: some of the buyers you’re talking to through Discretion, mostly private equity and perhaps some strategics, are telling you that if a company has none of these five moats, they won’t even show it to their investment committee. So some of them are saying it’s a pass without at least one of these.
Einar Vollset (27:54): Yeah. And that circles back to what we started talking about: how do you tell that sentiment is risk off in private markets? In the public markets it’s easy, the stock prices crash. But in private markets, you can tell when you see repeat buyers putting higher and higher hurdles up before even looking. And just so you know, the investment committee is the group that signs off on sending an LOI and actually doing a deal. If that committee at a private equity firm is saying, “Don’t even show us things unless these criteria are met,” that means that company is not buying your company no matter what.
Rob Walling (28:32): And to be clear, we’re saying some PE firms are saying this, not all. But even when some do, if it’s 30% or 50%, that will soften multiples. Any multiple range we give is always an auction. When someone says, “I’m doing three million a year, what can I sell for?” and you say, “Maybe 4x or maybe 15x, we’ve seen in the past two years,” they ask why the range is so big. And the answer is: it’s an auction. Someone had really great net revenue retention and someone really wanted to buy them. So you have to keep these moats in mind. One last thing I want to bring up before we wrap: a TinySeed founder asked, do these same AI moats apply to AI-native SaaS where AI is a core part of the product?
Rob Walling (29:23): And you said, “If anything, AI-native SaaS, where AI is the heart of it, has higher hurdles. Usually newer and faster growing, buyers will ask harder questions about the risks of disruption.” Talk me through that.
Einar Vollset (29:37): So we’re seeing stories about folks going from zero to four million of ARR in like three months because it’s an AI SaaS thing. It’s certainly true that a lot of these businesses are getting very fast adoption, but we’ve also seen, and I know of at least one private equity firm that invested in one of these fast-growing things and it went to zero within a year. And that’s what they’re worried about. The key thing to understand here is that founders are sometimes a little frustrated with private equity because they think of them more like venture capitalists. Venture capitalists will take extremely high risks because they’re expecting a vast majority of their investments to go to zero.
Einar Vollset (30:25): That is not what private equity does. Private equity, if anything, is slower to adopt new sentiment because their whole business model depends upon being able to underwrite the downside risk. And so that is the challenge when it comes to AI. They don’t have a good mental model, or even an Excel model, of how to think about the risks to these businesses. So in that case, they’ll tend to step back. An example from Discretion Capital: we had a business we were selling called Zyra Talk. It was basically an AI voice agent, like a receptionist for HVAC companies. This business had great metrics on every measure: growth, retention, integrations. They had everything. We showed them to the market and had tons of interest, lots of strategic interest, lots of private equity interest.
Einar Vollset (31:16): They actually ended up selling to a Fortune 500 public company called Evercommerce. So they sold to a pure strategic. But with the private equity firms, we had tons of interest, and the way it normally works in an auction is you go to market, show all the marketing materials, and the people who are really interested will do a management meeting before making a bid. I think we had something like 22 or 23 management meetings, which is quite high. I was expecting an avalanche of LOIs because the metrics were great. But not a single one of the private equity firms even put in an LOI. It became a fight between strategics in that auction. So the mental model to have here is that private equity tends to be much more risk averse than people think, and also a little slower to react.
Einar Vollset (32:08): So when things are going bad, they very quickly shut down, but when things are loosening up again, it takes a while for them to unwind. I remember being so frustrated in 2022, saying, “You guys have been telling me for years that prices are too high and there’s too much competition. Now is the opportunity. Go against the stream.” They could have made a killing if they’d actually started bidding in 2022 and picked things up for 50% of earlier prices.
Rob Walling (32:50): Well, thanks, man, for coming on the show and giving basically the boots-on-the-ground report to the podcast audience, because this is info you can’t find elsewhere. You’re not going to see this on TechCrunch. This is not in some blog or book. It’s stuff you’re seeing on the front lines. So really appreciate you spending the time with me today. If folks want to read your most recent book, discretioncapital.com/guide. And of course you are Einar Vollset on X/Twitter. And if there’s a founder listening who’s like, “I think I’m going to be hitting two million ARR in the next 12-ish months—”
Einar Vollset (33:25): Or 10. 10 is fine too.
Rob Walling (33:26): At least two.
Rob Walling (33:28): If they’re between two and 20, or think they’re going to get there, they can reach out directly to you, Einar, E-I-N-A-R at discretioncapital.com. Thanks again, man.
Einar Vollset (33:37): Thank you.
Rob Walling (33:38): Thanks again to Einar for coming on the show and lending his wisdom from the front lines, and thanks to you for listening this week and every week. This is Rob Walling signing off from episode 836.
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